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JUL 16 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: ADPC

SUBJECT: CANCELLATION - Report of POCC Special Working Group

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1. [REDACTED] and I have gone over the Working Group report, which I left with you on July 9th. We propose that you take the following positions with respect to its recommendations.

Working Group Recommendations and Proposed Positions

"a. Tab "A", Initial Intelligence Requirements, be furnished the collection agencies as high priority requirements and that the same be furnished PSB for consideration and possible modification at a later time."

This recommendation should be adopted. Although these requirements are, of course, among existing intelligence targets, raising their priority might increase the flow of intelligence, which has been extremely scanty. Since we assume that when it is ready to do so, PSB will take over the overall direction of CANCELLATION, notice of these requirements should be furnished PSB for information now and for changes later on as required.

"b. POCC inform PSB of the studies which are underway for the purpose of developing the information needed for further planning."

This information should be furnished PSB for the same reason as above.

"c. Tab "B" be approved as an interim overt propaganda position of the US for the contingency of Stalin's death prior to the development of the initial plan."

We recommend that you state no objection to the first three paragraphs of this position but that you suggest a change in the fourth paragraph as follows:

"Even before a Governmental Agency, such as the Voice, can say anything, it should be possible and desirable for reliable and democratically oriented emigre and other unofficial individuals and organizations, with the guidance and support of the appropriate Agency of the Government, to issue appeals to put an end to Stalin's clique of lieutenants and to establish a free democratic Russia."

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The purpose of this rewording is:

- (1) To eliminate reference to a particular (and in this case obscure) emigre group in a policy paper of this general nature.
- (2) To remove the impression that no machinery now exists for fostering and maintaining relationship with emigre groups who are democratically oriented.

"d. The State and Defense members of the working group recommend that Tab "C" be approved by the POCC and forwarded to PSB for its approval and action. The CIA member recommends that Tab "C" be noted by POCC and forwarded to PSB as an unofficial paper for its information."

We recommend that you do not approve Tab "C" of the Working Group's report. As the CIA member of the Working Group, I objected to this report, which was prepared by Lieut. Comdr. Scherbatoff (Naval Intelligence Officer assigned to Barrett Board Secretariat) and Lieut. Colonel MacKenzie (General McClure's Staff) on the grounds that there is not yet sufficient information upon which to make an informed judgment as to the validity of many of the statements made in this paper and the actions proposed by it. I suggested to the Working Group that it be noted by POCC and forwarded for information only to PSB. We suggest that you take the same position.

2. In addition to the foregoing, we recommend that you take one further action at the meeting. Paragraph 2c of the Working Group's report reads as follows:

"The Working Group understands that there is a possibility that CIA may undertake a special study, which focused directly upon the problem of succession, would attempt to gather together the best judgments of those who have intimate knowledge of the Soviet system as to the characteristics of the individuals at its apex and of the power mechanisms under their control."

3. Many of us feel that before much progress can be made with CANCELLATION, a down-to-earth study must be made which, focused directly on the problem of succession, will attempt to gather together and evaluate all best judgments as to questions such as the following: Who are the individuals most likely to be chosen by Stalin to succeed him? In the event of conflict over the succession who is most apt to win out? What are the vulnerabilities and soft spots among members of the politburo that can be used to foster suspicions, animosities, and mistrust which will lead to a conflict over the succession before and after Stalin's death? Which, if any, of the probable candidates might be willing to modify Soviet policies in a manner consistent with our interests in return for support in a fight for succession, etc.?

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4. In May the question of how to go about such a study was discussed with the Policy Planning Staff at State, and the consensus then was that such a study could not best be handled through routine intelligence channels. This was for the reason that for best results, neither the investigation nor the evaluation could be orthodox. Thus, it was felt that the study must embrace the speculations, best guesses, reports of gossip, etc., from all of the Hilgers, Tuominens, present and former party members to whom access is available, the individuals throughout the Western world who have had contact with politburo members in one form or another. The conclusions based on these personal opinions, it was thought, should then be reviewed by our best minds (Kennan, Boblan, [redacted], etc.), and from this would come a combined best judgment as to the answers to questions such as the foregoing. The thought was, therefore, that some especially qualified individual should be given the job of research, that he should be assisted as necessary by the PSB agencies, and that his findings should be reviewed by a panel of experts of the Kennan calibre.

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5. We recommend that at the meeting you state the need for this special study and evaluation for the particular purposes of CANCELLATION; that barring objection, you intend having it undertaken, and that you would welcome suggestions as to the best person to undertake it. Admiral Stevens and Joe Phillips will support you and I suspect that if you give the Admiral the opening, that he will indicate his interest in participating in it after he has retired. He will probably also suggest [redacted] for the study. We are not convinced that [redacted] is the man, and are considering other possibilities for the purpose of making a recommendation to you.

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6. For your own information, the Plans Division is not satisfied that all planning on this subject should be deferred until further intelligence can be obtained. This is for the following reasons:

a. Such further intelligence may be either unobtainable or extremely slow in forthcoming.

b. Stalin might die at any time.

The Division believes that there is a strong possibility that desirable courses of action may become discernable even on the small base of intelligence now existing. Accordingly it is "crashing" a plan as a staff-exercise to obtain a possible emergency plan, and as a background paper for use in conjunction with further planning. It is intended that, at the outset, at least, this planning exercise should take place entirely within OPC. PSB should be informed of these steps whenever the appropriate time comes.

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7. Attached for your information, if you have not seen them, are copies of [redacted] memorandum to Mr. Joyce and a copy of [redacted] original paper.

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**Enclosure:**

1. Tab "A" - Working Group Report  
2. Tab "B" -  Memo to Mr. Joyce  
3. Tab "C" -  Paper

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Enclosures TAB A